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A major problem in using iterative number generators of the form xi D f (xi¡1) is that they can enter
unexpectedly short cycles. This is hard to analyze when the generator is designed, hard to detect in real
time when the generator is used, and can have devastating cryptanalytic implications. In this paper we
define a measure of security, called sequence diversity, which generalizes the notion of cycle-length
for noniterative generators. We then introduce the class of counter-assisted generators and show how to
turn any iterative generator (even a bad one designed or seeded by an adversary) into a counter-assisted
generator with a provably high diversity, without reducing the quality of generators which are already
cryptographically strong. C° 2001 Elsevier Science
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider the problem of generating long cryptographically secure sequences by iter-
ative number generators which start at some seed value x0D s and extend it by computing xi D f (xi¡1)
where f is some function. The i th output of the generator is a (typically shorter) value yi D g(xi ) derived
from the internal state by some output function g (Fig. 1). If f is a secret keyed function, then g may
be the identity.
A major application of number generators is to encrypt cleartexts by XORing them with the generated
outputs. In this case, the seed s is a secret key which is shared by the communicating parties, but is
unknown to the eavesdropping adversary.
Since the state space is finite, the sequence of internal states xi will eventually become periodic with
some period p; i.e., xi D xiCp for all i larger than some i0. Any cycling of the state sequence causes a
cycling of the output sequence with period at most p. A particularly worrisome problem is the possibility
that i0 and p may be unexpectedly small, and therefore the cycling point i0C p is actually achieved.
This can happen even in very complex generators. An interesting example is Knuth’s Super-random
number generator (Algorithm K) [9, Sect. 3.1], which converges rapidly to a fixed point (that is, i0 is
very small, and pD 1).
If the cycling point i0C p is achieved, then the XOR of the i th and i C pth ciphertexts is equal
to the XOR of the i th and i C pth cleartexts, for all i ‚ i0. If the cleartexts have a sufficiently high
redundancy, the cryptanalyst can detect the cycling by noticing the nonuniform statistics of such XOR’s
and then recover the actual cleartexts from their known pairwise XOR’s. Even if the cleartexts have no
redundancy, knowledge of some cleartexts will make it possible to find other cleartexts encrypted with
the same repeated values.
1.1. Partial Solutions
1.1.1. Online Monitoring
A possible solution to this problem is to monitor each execution in real time. If a particular seed leads
to early cycling, the cryptographic operation is stopped and the seed is replaced. However, this can be
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FIGURE 1
very disruptive if the exchange of new seeds is time consuming or difficult to arrange. Note further that
real time detection of cycling behavior using hash tables requires a very large memory, whereas other
methods such as Floyd’s two pointer cycle detection algorithm (see, e.g., [9, p. 7]) are not guaranteed
to detect cycles as soon as they are entered.
1.1.2. Experimental Testings
The designer of the generator can test its behavior by applying f a limited number of times to a
limited number of random seeds (see [2]). However, such testing cannot be exhaustive, and thus even
if no cycling is ever detected in these tests, the next seed or the next step can lead to a cycling.
1.1.3. Pseudorandom Functions
Pseudorandom functions f : X! X are functions which are chosen from the space of all possible
functions g : X! X with a relatively low-entropy distribution, but which are difficult to tell apart from
truly random functions (which are selected from the space of all possible functions g : X! X with
uniform distribution). For any adversary with unlimited computational power and access to a polynomial
(in log jX j) number of values of a pseudorandom function f , the probability that the adversary can tell
that these values came from f rather than from a truly random g should be negligible. Pseudorandom
permutations and pseudorandom sequences are defined similarly to be low entropy but difficult to
distinguish from truly random permutations and sequences, respectively. For more precise definitions
see [7, 10, 13, Sect. 2.2, 20] and references therein.
It is easy to see (and well known) that sequences generated by iterative number generators with
pseudorandom functions f are pseudorandom. Thus, the probability that such a generator enters a small
cycle is negligible. However, all known constructions of pseudorandom functions are slow and are based
on unproved conjectures (see [16, Sect. 17.9]). In fact, all practical functions used in cryptography are
ad-hoc constructions which are not proved to be pseudorandom, and nothing is known about the actual
structure of the cycles they generate.1 This is particularly worrisome for the user, since there is no
guarantee that the generators that he or she uses do not contain a trapdoor leading to short cycles.2
1.1.4. Mathematically Structured Generators
The need to avoid short cycles is the major motivation behind the development of several families
of generators based on mathematical structures. These families include linear congruential generators,
linear feedback shift registers (LFSR’s), clock-controlled LFSR’s, additive generators, feedback with
carry shift registers, 1=p generators (see [16 Sects. 16–17] and references therein), and TSR’s [18].
Under certain conditions, these families can be proved to have large cycles.
The drawback of this approach is that their mathematical structure can be often used to cryptanalyze
them (see [16, Sects. 16–17] for references to cryptanalysis of various implementations of the mentioned
generators).
1 A notable exception appears in [8] and [5], where the cycle structure of nonlinear feedback shift registers is studied. However,
the obtained results cover only degenerate cases. Moreover, in [8] it is proved that the studied generators must have short cycles.
2 Knuth’s example could be viewed as such a trapdoor generator.
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1.1.5. Re-keying
Chambers [3] suggested a technique to reduce the risk of short cycles by restarting the generator’s
internal state every fixed number of iterations, with a new key seed taken from a re-keying generator
which has a provably large cycle (e.g., one of the generators mentioned in Section 1.1.4).
Given an iterative generator, let pk , kD 1; 2; : : : , be the probability that the cycling point of the
generator occurs after at least k iterations. Assume that we use the generator to get an output sequence
of size m. The probability that we do not reach the cycling point in the usual iterative mode is pm . Now,
if we re-key the generator every k iterations, then the probability that we do not reach the cycling point
even once is pm=kk . As nothing is known on the cycle structure of the generator, there is no guarantee
that pm=kk is greater than pm . It may thus be the case that the re-keying mode is worse than the standard
iterative mode.
Moreover, if the re-keying generator is cryptographically weak, then it could be cryptanalyzed from
the outputs which come immediately after the re-keying phases.
One should note further that, as Schneier points out in [16, Sect. 17.11], algorithms that have a long
key setup routine are not suitable for this mode.
1.1.6. Similarity Transformations and Counter-mode
Another possible solution is to take some simple permutation u which is guaranteed to have long
cycles (e.g., u(x)D x C 1 (mod n), or any of the examples from Section 1.1.4.) and then to use f u f ¡1
(instead of f ) as the iteration function. This similarity transformation has the same cycle structure as u.
Such a construction is, though, rather degenerate. Let h f; gi stand for a generator whose iteration
function is f and whose output function is g. Consider a generator of the form h f u f ¡1; gi. Define g˜ D g–
f . Then for all seeds s, setting s˜D f ¡1(s) implies that the i th output is g(( f u f ¡1)i (s))D g( f ui f ¡1(s))D
(g – f )(ui (s˜))D g˜(ui (s˜)); that is, the generator is equivalent to the generator hu; g˜i. This means that the
modified generator is equivalent to another generator with a cryptographically weak iteration function.
For u(x)D x C 1 (mod n) we conclude that for some g˜, the i th output of the generator equals g˜(s˜C i).
Generators of the form yi D g(sC i) are called counter-mode generators and are a standard mode
of operation [16, Sect. 9.9]. However, such generators have the following unpleasant property: The
difference of any two input values sC i and sC j to g is simply i ¡ j . If i is close to j , then i ¡ j has
a small Hamming weight. This fact could be used in differential or correlation cryptanalysis of g. This
is also the case for other choices of u, e.g., if u is an LFSR, then ui (s) and u j (s) are equal in all except
for i ¡ j bits.
2. THE DIVERSITY OF SEQUENCE GENERATORS
In this section we propose a new notion of security for sequence generators, which generalizes the
cryptographically desirable concept of long cycles.
We first define the notion of diversity for a single infinite sequence.
DEFINITION 2.1. The diversity of a sequence xD (x0; x1; x2; : : : ) is the function Dx(k) for kD
1; 2; 3; : : : defined as the minimum number of distinct values occurring in any contiguous subsequence
xi ; xi C 1; : : : ; xi C k¡1 of length k in x.
All of the sequences considered in this paper have a finite sample space of jX j D n possible values.
For any sequence x in X ,
1•Dx(k)•Dx(kC 1)•Dx(k)C 1• n:
In other words, the diversity grows monotonically and at most linearly with k and cannot exceed n.
We now generalize the concept from sequences to generators. We first define the types of generators
considered in this paper:
DEFINITION 2.2. An iterative generator is a structure GDhX; Y; f : X! X; g : X! Y i, where for
all x 2 X , f (x) and g(x) can be computed in polynomial time from x . X is the state space, and Y is the
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output space. We may write GDh f; gi for short or G : xi D f (xi¡1) if the output function is not relevant.
For a generator G : xi D f (xi¡1) and seed s 2 X , we denote the state sequence (x0D s; x1; : : : ) of the
generated internal states by G(s).
We wish to bound from below the diversity of the sequences of internal states generated from possible
seeds.
DEFINITION 2.3. The diversity of an iterative generator G : xi D f (xi¡1) is the function
DG(k)D minfDG(s)(k) : s 2 Xg
defined for kD 1; 2; 3; : : : . The total diversity of G is the limit limk!1DG(k).3
Iterative generators on finite spaces have simple diversity functions.
LEMMA 2.1. Assume that G : xi D f (xi¡1) is an iterative generator.
1. Let x be a sequence (of internal states) created by G. Then Dx(k)D minfk; pg where p is the
length of the cycle that x enters into.
2. DG(k)D minfk; pg where p is the length of the shortest cycle in f .
Proof. x has distinct values before it enters the cycle and while it completes the first traversal of the
cycle. This implies (1) and (2) follows from (1).
The diversity of an iterative generator is thus directly related to the size of its smallest cycle. It is
intended to capture one aspect of the worst case behavior of a generator in the sense that generators
with provably high diversity cannot repeat a small number of internal states a large number of times as
a result of an unlucky or adversarial choice of seed.
The diversity measure can be applied to noniterative generators, in which the computation of xi may
depend on its index i as well.
DEFINITION 2.4. A counter-dependent generator is a structureGDhX; Y; F : X £N! X; g : X! Y i,
where for all x 2 X and i 2 N, F(x; i) and g(x) can be computed in polynomial time from x . X is
the state space, and Y is the output space. In this type of generators, the next state is calculated by
xi D F(xi¡1; i). Here too, we denote the state sequence (x0D s; x1; : : : ) of generated internal states by
G(s).
Note that iterative as well as counter-mode generators are particular cases of counter-dependent
generators. A straightforward generalization of Definition 2 for counter-dependent generators is:
DEFINITION 2.5.
1. The diversity of a counter-dependent generator G : xi D F(xi¡1; i) is the function DG(k)D
minfDG(s)(k) : s 2 Xgdefined for kD 1; 2; 3; : : : . The total diversityDtotalG ofG is the limit limk!1DG(k).
2. A counter-dependent generator G : xi D F(xi¡1; i) is g(k)-diverse if DG(k)‚g(k) for all kD
1; 2; : : : .
The diversity of a general counter-dependent generator can grow and freeze in an irregular way when
k increases, since these generators are not forced into a cycle when they accidentally repeat the same
xi value. The diversity function is thus a natural generalization of the notion of cycle size.
3. MODIFYING GENERATORS
In this section we consider several ways in which we can modify a given iterative generator in order
to increase its diversity. The main intuitive conditions we impose on this process are:
3 Anderson et al. [2] suggested a statistically oriented notion of diversity for random number generators, based on experimental
testings of the generator. These testings give estimations for the average case behavior, whereas our notion bounds the worst case
behavior of the generator. Moreover, the combinatorial nature of our notion will make it possible to use mathematical theory in
order to apply it to cases where experimental testings are not suitable (e.g., when the state space is huge). See also Section 1.1.2.
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Condition 3.1. We do not want to design the new generator from scratch. We usually prefer to use
known and well-studied primitives such as DES, RC5, or nonlinear feedback shift registers, for which
highly optimized code can be easily obtained or reused from other parts of the application. We thus
want the modified design to use the same cryptographic ingredients as the original design.
Condition 3.2. The computational complexity of the modified next-state function must not be
significantly greater than that of the original one.
Condition 3.3. The modification technique should be uniformly applicable to all iterative generators,
treating them as black boxes. We do not want the modification to be based on the mathematical or
statistical properties of the given iteration function f . In particular, we cannot assume that we know the
structure of its cycles.
Condition 3.4. We are more interested in increasing the diversity of the interval values xi than in
increasing the diversity of the output values yi D g(xi ): If the given generator uses an output function g
with a small range (e.g., a single bit) applying diversity measures to the output values is meaningless.
The modification should be a win–win situation: If the given generator has a low diversity, the problem
should be rectified, but if the given generator is already strong, we do not want the modification to weaken
it. The problem is that we do not have a general quantitative definition of the goodness of generators,
except when they are perfect. We thus concentrate in this paper on the following formal interpretation.
Condition 3.5.
1. For any given iteration function, the modified generator should be g(k)-diverse for some g(k)
which is exponential in log n.
2. If the iteration function f is pseudorandom, then the state sequences generated from random
seeds by the modified generator should be pseudorandom.
As in counter-mode (see Section 1.1.6), our black box modification technique is based on turning
the iterative generator into a counter-dependent generator, allowing xi to depend on i in addition to
xi¡1. To sharpen our intuition, let us consider some bad constructions. (In the following examples and
throughout the paper, the state space X is identified with the set f0; 1; : : : ; n ¡ 1g, and addition in the
state space is carried modulo n.)
EXAMPLE 3.1. xi D i . This function has maximal diversity, but poor cryptographic quality.
EXAMPLE 3.2. xi D f (i). This is the standard counter-mode. Perfect generators remain perfect, but
for a constant f the diversity is 1.
EXAMPLE 3.3. xi D f (i)C i . This is a simple combination of the previous two examples. Perfect
generators remain perfect, but for f (x)D ¡x , all the generated xi are 0, and thus the diversity is 1.
EXAMPLE 3.4. xi D f (xi¡1C i). This is an attempt to force the next state to depend both on the
previous state and on the index. Perfect generators remain perfect, but the generated sequence has
diversity 1 when f is a constant function.
EXAMPLE 3.5. xi D f (xi¡1C i)C i . This is the “kitchen sink” approach, trying to combine all the
ingredients in all possible ways. However, when the function f is f (x)D ¡x , the sequence generated
from any initial seed x0D s is s;¡s; s;¡s; s;¡s; : : : which contains at most two values.
Considering these counter-examples, the reader may suspect that all black box modifications are bad
(for some f ). In the next section we show that this is not the case.
4. A PROVABLY GOOD MODIFICATION TECHNIQUE
Given an iterative generator h f; gi, we apply the following black box modification.
DEFINITION 4.1. A counter-assisted generator h f; gi is a generator in which x0D s, and for all
i ‚ 1, xi D f (xi¡1)C i (mod n), where n is the size of the state space, and the i th output is g(xi )
(see Fig. 2).
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FIGURE 2
Since it is easy to maintain or obtain a counter for the number of values produced so far (in many
applications, one can use either the loop counter or the running block-number as a counter for the
counter-assisted mode), and no change is made in the function f or g, the modification technique
is completely trivial and can be applied to any iterative generator without increasing its comple-
xity.
Formally, for all generators hX; Y; f; gi, the counter-assisted modified generator is in fact the iterative
generator hX £ f0; : : : ; n ¡ 1g; Y; F;Gi, where
F(x; i) D ( f (x)C i (mod n); i C 1 (mod n))
(1)G(x; i) D g(x):
However, note that:
1. The only secret part is located in the x coordinate,
2. incrementing i has no cryptographical significance, and
3. the output calculation G(x; i) is independent of the i-coordinate.
Thus applying diversity measures on the whole state space X £ f0; : : : ; n ¡ 1g—that is, measuring the
diversity of the sequences of pairs (xi ; i), i D 1; 2; : : :—is misleading (and, in fact, not informative).
This is why the diversity measure is focused on the actual state sequences G(s)D (x0D s; x1; : : : ) rather
than on the sequence of pairs (xi ; i).
LEMMA 4.1. Let xD (x0; x1; x2; : : : ) be a state sequence of a counter-assisted generator. Then for
all i 6D j (mod n); if xi D x j then xiC1 6D x jC1 and xi¡1 6D x j¡1.
Proof. We argue modulo n. By definition, xi C 1D f (xi )C (i C 1) and x j C 1D f (x j )C ( j C 1). If
xi D x j but i 6D j , then necessarily xiC1 6D x jC1. Now, for the very same reason, xi¡1D x j¡1 would
imply xi 6D x j , which is not the case. j
In other words, the sequence x has the interesting property that equality at any pair of locations implies
inequality at the pair of their immediate successors and the pair of their immediate predecessors. We call
this the isolated equality property. This is the intuitive reason why counter-assisted generators cannot
enter short cycles: If they accidentally generate the same value at several locations, all the subsequent
computations are guaranteed to diverge rather than converge.
THEOREM 4.1.
1. The black box modification technique modifying G : xi D f (xi¡1) to G 0 : xi D f (xi¡1)C i
(mod n) is maxfg(k);h(k)g-diverse; where
g(k)D
(p
k ¡ 1 k • np
n n < k
; and h(k)D
(
k=j Im( f )j k • n
n=j Im( f )j n < k :
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2. If the iteration function f is pseudorandom; then the state sequences generated from random
seeds by the modified generator are pseudorandom.
Proof. (1) We first show that g(k) • DG 0 (k) for all kD 1; 2; : : : . Consider any sequence of k
consecutive values xi ; xi C 1; : : : ; xi C k¡1 (k • nC 1) and assume that it contains exactly ” distinct
values. There are ”2 possible ordered pairs of these values (a; b), and by Lemma 4.1 each one of them
can occur at most once in a consecutive pair of locations (x j ; x j C 1) along the sequence. Since there are
k ¡ 1 such locations, ”2 ‚ k ¡ 1, which yields the desired lower bound on ”.
Next, we need to show that h(k) • DG 0 (k) for all kD 1; 2; : : : . In a sequence of k consecutive values
xi ; xi C 1; : : : ; xi C k¡1 (k • nC 1), each x j is of the form c j C j , where c j 2 Im( f ). Since we add k
distinct values to at most j Im( f )j values, we get at least k=j Im( f )j distinct values.
(2) We now sketch the proof of the pseudorandomness part. Consider the following sequence of
oracles, which accept a number k (which is polynomial in log n) and output a sequence x1; : : : ; xk 2 X .
(By random we mean statistically independent and uniformly distributed.)
Oracle 1: Returns a random sequence xi 2 X (i D 1; 2; : : : ; k).
Oracle 2: Chooses a random seed x0D s, and defines an f : X! X on the fly, as follows:
1. A flag Birthday is initially set to 0.
2. For each i D 1; 2; : : : ; k:
— If f (xi¡1) is undefined, then choose a random y 2 X and define f (xi¡1)D y.
— Otherwise, set BirthdayD 1.
3. Set xi D f (xi¡1)C i .
The remaining values of f are chosen randomly.
Oracle 3: Chooses a particular function f with uniform probability from the set of all func-
tions from X to X , chooses a random seed x0D s, and returns the sequence xi with xi D f (xi¡1)C i ,
i D 1; 2; : : : ; k.
Oracle 4: Same as Oracle 3, but with f pseudorandom instead of truly random.
We say that two oracles are distinguishable if there exists a (not necessarily polynomial time) algorithm
(called distinguisher) which, for some constant c > 0, given a sequence of length polynomial in log n,
can tell with probability greater than 1= log(n)c which oracle has generated this sequence. Otherwise,
the oracles are indistinguishable. It is clear that Oracles 2 and 3 are indistinguishable. That Oracles 3
and 4 are indistinguishable follows from the fact that any distinguisher of these oracles can be used to
construct a distinguisher of pseudorandom functions from random ones.
It remains to show that Oracles 1 and 2 are indistinguishable. The only possible constraint on the
output of Oracle 2 happens when f is applied twice to the same argument, that is, Birthday is set to 1.
It is well known that for k ¿ n, the probability that no birthday occurs is close to k2=(2n) [17], which
is negligible if k is polynomial in log n. j
Remark. The upper bound k2=(2n) on the distinguishing probability is tight: In probability close to
k2=(2n), a birthday xi D x j occurs and the distinguisher can check that xiC1¡ (i C 1)D x jC1¡ ( j C 1).
Provided this, the probability that the output came from Oracle 1 is 1=n.
5. ASYMPTOTIC TIGHTNESS OF THE PROVABLE DIVERSITY
The square root lower bound on the diversity may seem to be an artifact of the proof technique. We
first consider the purely combinatorial version of the problem: What is the longest sequence one can
construct from ” distinct symbols which has the isolated equality property?
LEMMA 5.1. For any positive integer ”; there exists a sequence of length ”2C 1 consisting of ”
symbols and having the isolated equality property.
Proof. Let C be a complete directed graph with ” vertices and ”2 directed edges (including self
loops). As the graph is connected and the indegree and outdegree of each vertex in C is the same (D”),
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the graph is Eulerian. Let v0e0v1e1 ¢ ¢ ¢ v”2¡1e”2¡1v0 be an Eulerian tour, which includes each directed
edge exactly once. Assume that for some distinct i and j , vi D v j . If viC1D v jC1, then necessarily ei D e j ,
which is disallowed in Eulerian tours. Similarly, vi¡1D v j¡1 would imply ei¡1D e j¡1. Consequently,
the sequence has the isolated equality property. j
This combinatorial result does not rule out the possibility that sequences created by counter-assisted
generators must satisfy additional constraints, and as a result the lower bound in Theorem 4.1 can be
improved significantly. We will show that this is not the case: We prove the asymptotic tightness of
our lower bound by constructing for each n a specific counter-assisted generator such that the total
diversities of these counter-assisted generators are O(pn).
THEOREM 5.1. There exist functions fn; nD 1; 2; : : : such that the total diversities DtotalGn of the
counter-assisted generators Gn : xi D fn(xi¡1)C i (mod n) are O(pn).
Proof. Fix a natural number n. We will write for short f and G instead of fn and Gn , respectively.
The state sequence of G will be based on two sequences: a0; a1; : : : ; afi¡1 and b0; b1; : : : ; bfl¡1 (the
values of fi and fl will be determined later). The sequences are meshed as follows:
1. Locations with even indices contain only the ai values, and locations with odd indices contain
only the b j values.
2. The ai values occur in block order: The first fl occurrences are a0, the next fl occurrences are
a1, and so on.
3. The b j values occur in cyclic order: The first fl occurrences are b0; : : : ; bfl¡1 in this order, the
next fl occurrences are again b0; : : : ; bfl¡1 in this order, and so on.
Putting these blocks in consecutive rows, we get a matrix C D (ci j ) of size fi £ 2fl, where ci;2 j D ai
and ci;2 jC1D b j :
C D
0BBB@
a0 b0 a0 b1 ¢ ¢ ¢ a0 bfl¡1
a1 b0 a1 b1 ¢ ¢ ¢ a1 bfl¡1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
afi¡1 b0 afi¡1 b1 ¢ ¢ ¢ afi¡1 bfl¡1
1CCCA :
We define a function f for which the counter-assisted generator G : xi D f (xi¡1)C i , seeded by
x0D a0, has state sequence equal to our meshed sequence.
We begin with a few simple restrictions on our parameters. For cyclicity the counter must return to
0 after 2fifl steps; that is, 2fifl D 0 (mod n). We will consider fi’s and fl’s such that 2fifl D n to make
the sequence shorter. The isolated equality property implies that all of the ai and b j values are distinct.
Thus, the total diversity will be fiCfl.
Under these restrictions, we can see via elementary calculus that the choice fiDfl Dpn=2 yields the
minimum possible total diversity of fiCfl Dp2n values.
We thus begin with n’s for which n=2 is a square and choose fiDfl Dpn=2.
We now consider the specific values of the elements in our meshed sequence. The conditions are:
ci; jC1D f (ci j )C 2fli C ( j C 1), ci C 1;0D f (ci;2fl¡1)C 2fl(i C 1)¡ 1, and c00D f (cfi¡1;2fl¡1)C 2fifl. In
terms of the ai and b j this is:
b j D f (ai )C 2fli C (2 j C 1)
ai D f (b j )C 2fli C (2 j C 2) ( j D 0; : : : ; fl ¡ 2)
ai D f (bfl¡1)C 2fli:
Setting x D f (a0), the first equation yields b j D x C (2 j C 1) for i D 0. Putting this back in the equa-
tion we get that f (ai )D x ¡ 2fli for all i . Similarly, the second equation implies (setting yD f (b0))
ai D yC 2fli C 2 and f (b j )D y¡2 j for all j < fl¡1. The third equation with i D 0 gives f (bfl¡1)D a0D
yC 2.
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We therefore have, for any choice of x; y, the following requirements:
ai D yC 2C 2fli f7! x ¡ 2fli
b j D x C 1C 2 j f7! y ¡ 2 j ( j <fl ¡ 1)
bfl¡1 D x ¡ 1C 2fl f7! yC 2:
It is easy to check that any such definition yields the desired sequence of states, as long as the resultant
ai and b j ’s are disjoint. As we assume that n is even, choosing any x and y having the same parity (e.g.,
x D yD 0) will do.
The values of f on X nfai ; b j g can be arbitrary. It remains to check that the sequence is repeated
after every fi ¢ 2fl steps. Indeed, the counter will be 2fifl D 0 (mod n), and thus x2fifl D f (x2fifl¡1)C 0D
f (bfl¡1)D a0, so we are right where we begun.
We now treat the cases where n=2 is not a square. Set fiDfl Dbpn=2 c, and define ai , b j , and f
as above. Now modify f (x) to f (x mod 2fifl). The above argument shows that if we project the state-
sequence x modulo 2fifl, we get diversity at most fiCfl D O(pn). Therefore, the actual diversity can
be no more than O(pn) ¢ dn=(2fifl) eD O(pn) ¢ 2D O(pn). j
Remark. In most practical cases, n=2 is not a square and thus we cannot achieve the exact
p
2n
upper bound using our meshing construction. However, in many cases n is an even power of 2 (e.g., 224,
232, 264, 2128, etc.), so we can choose fiDpn and fl Dpn=2 (note that 2fifl D n) to get total diversity
fiCfl D 3pn=2, which is close to thep2n upper bound achieved in the case where n=2 was a square.
Our construction showed that the bound
p
n for the total diversity is asymptotically tight. However,
we do not have a construction where DG(k) is O(
p
k) for all k simultaneously.
Open problem 5.2. Does there exist a constant c such that for all sufficiently large n; there exists a
counter-assisted generator G (with state space of size n) such that DG(k) • c
p
k for all k?
6. CASCADE COUNTER-ASSISTED GENERATORS
In this section we generalize the notion of counter-assisted generators.
A Latin square is a binary function which is uniquely invertible given its output and any one of
the inputs. For example, the operations x C y (mod n), x ¡ y (mod n) and x ' y are Latin square
operations. Moreover, every group operation is a Latin square operation, and if x ? y is a Latin square
operation and P; Q; Z are permutations, then Z (P(x) ? Q(y)) is a Latin square operation. Let ? be a
Latin square operation.
It is easy to see that the proof of Theorem 4.1 applies when the C i modification is replaced by
any Latin square operation ?i (unique invertibility with respect to the i input guarantees the isolated
equality property, and unique invertibility with respect to the xi input guarantees the pseudorandomness
of the states). We can thus extend the concept of counter-assisted generators to include these cases as
well.
Remark. When n is a power of 2, we can use essentially the same construction as in the proof of
Theorem 5.1 to show the optimality of the ˜(pn) lower bound when the C i (mod n) modification is
replaced by a 'i modification.
The next lemma shows that counter-mode generators are a degenerated case of counter-assisted
generators.
LEMMA 6.1. Every counter-mode generator is a counter-assisted generator.
Proof. A counter-mode generator with i th output g(s ? i) is equivalent to the counter-assisted
generator GDh f; gi, where f · s, and the Latin square operation is ?, since in this case, xi D f (xi¡1)?
i D s ? i . j
We can extend the notion of counter-assisted generators further. Assume that GDh f; g; X; Y i
is an iterative generator, and let cDhc0; c1; : : :i be any sequence of elements in X . Define the
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sequence-assisted generator G ? c to be the generator whose i th state is xi D f (xi¡1) ? ci (and whose
i th output is g(xi )).
THEOREM 6.1. Let GDh f; gi ? c be a sequence-assisted generator. Then:
1. DG(k) ‚
p
Dc(k)¡ 1 for all kD 1; 2; : : : .
2. If the the sequence c is pseudorandom; then the state sequence of G is pseudorandom.
3. If f is pseudorandom; then the state sequence of G is pseudorandom.
Proof. (1) As in Lemma 4, we can show that ci 6D c j implies (xi¡1; xi ) 6D (x j¡1; x j ). The rest of the
proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1 (1).
(2) If the state sequence of G is not pseudorandom, then the sequence c can be distinguished from
pseudorandom noise by considering h f; gi ? c and looking at the state sequence of G.
(3) This is proved as in Theorem 4.1 (2); the only difference is in the definition of Oracle 3. j
Thus, any sequence c with large diversity can be used instead of a counter. In particular, we can use
the output of any of the generators mentioned in Section 1.1.4 as the assisting sequence. In general,
assume that C is any generator with output in X . DefineG ? CDG ? c, where cDhc0; c1; : : :i is the output
sequence of C (note that the sequence c depends of the initialization of C). The following definition is
inductive.
DEFINITION 6.1. G is a cascade counter-assisted generator if:
1. G is a (standard) counter-assisted generator, or
2. GDF ? C, where F is an iterative generator, ? is a Latin square operation, and C is a cascade
counter-assisted generator.
In particular, we have:
LEMMA 6.2. Every iterative generator is a cascade counter-assisted generator.
Proof. If G is an iterative generator, and C is a generator with output function 0, then GC CDG is
a cascade counter-assisted generator. j
Thus the notion of cascade counter-assisted generators extends those of iterative, counter-mode, and
counter-assisted generators.
Ideally, all internal states of the cascaded generators (including the starting position of the counter i)
should be initialized by random, independent seeds. If this is not feasible, one can, e.g., initialize the
“driving” generator or the counter with a random seed and then clock the cascade a few times to make
all internal states depend on the seed. In this case, however, caution must be taken to make sure that
particular choice of output functions does not make the influence of the seed “vanish” while going down
the cascade.
EXAMPLE 6.1. Assume that the generators A, B, and C have state spaces of size nD 2256 (256 bits).
Assume further that the generator C is counter-based with an invertible output function gC and that
the output function gB of B is invertible as well. Consider the total diversity of the cascade generator
AC (B ' C) (see Fig. 3): As C is counter-based, we have DC(n)D n. Thus by Theorem 6.1 (and
discreteness), DB'C(n)‚d
p
n ¡ 1eD 2128 and DAC (B'C)(n)‚d
p
DB'C(n)¡ 1e‚ 264. Moreover, if
the output function of C, or any of the iteration functions of B, A is pseudorandom, then the state
sequence of A is pseudorandom as well. (We can also use, e.g., a maximal length LFSR instead of the
counter-based generator C to get the same results.)
Remark. In this section we have seen that every iterative generator can be viewed as a cascade
counter-assisted generator (in a degenerate manner). On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 4,
every counter-assisted generator can be viewed as an iterative generator (with a larger state space). The
advantage of our approach is that we focus on the cryptographical part of the generator, from which the
output is calculated, rather than on the state of the whole system.
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7. GENERATING SEQUENCES WITH MAXIMAL DIVERSITY
If we allow the design of a new output function g, then we can modify any generator to have the
maximal possible diversity DG(k)D k for all kD 1; 2; : : : ; n.
DEFINITION 7.1. Let G be any iterative generator. Modify its next-state function as follows:
x2iC1 D f (x2i )
x2iC2 D f (x2iC1)C i:
That is, the counter is incremented and added to the state value only once every two iterations of the
generator. The pair of generated values (x2i ; x2i C 1) is used as the argument of a new output function
g0 : X £ X! Y £ Y . We call this mode of operation the two-step counter-assisted mode. More generally,
the t-step counter-assisted mode is defined by incrementing and adding the counter once every t iterations
and using each t-tuple as the input of a new output function gˆ : Xt! Y t . Formally, the t-step generator
GDh f; g; X; Y i with Latin square operation ?i is the counter-assisted generator G t Dh ˆf ; gˆ; Xt ; Y t i
with the (injective) operation ?ˆi , where
† ˆf (x0; : : : ; xt¡1)D ( f (xt¡1); f 2(xt¡1); : : : ; f t (xt¡1)),
† (x0; : : : ; xt¡1)?ˆi D (x0; : : : ; xt¡1 ? i), and
† i is a cyclic counter in the range 0; 1; : : : ; n ¡ 1.
Note that t-step counter-assisted generators require a state buffer of size t .
For all t ‚ 2, any t-step counter-assisted generator has maximal possible diversity:
THEOREM 7.1. For any generator GDh f; gi; and for all t ‚ 2; we have the following:
1. If f is pseudorandom; then the state sequences of Gt are pseudorandom.
2. DGt (k)D k for all k D 1; : : : ; n.
x2
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2
x’
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3
+1
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FIG. 4. A two-step counter-assisted generator.
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Proof. The proof of the pseudorandomness part is similar to that in Theorem 4.1.
To prove the diversity part, assume that for some i 6D j (mod n) we have equality between the t-tuples
(xit ; : : : ; xitCt¡1) and (x jt ; : : : ; x jtCt¡1). In particular, xitCt¡2D x jtCt¡2. But this implies xitCt¡1D
f (xitCt¡2)C i 6D f (x jtCt¡2)C j D xitCt¡1 (mod n), a contradiction. j
7.1. Black-Box Modifications of the Output Function g
If the computational complexity of evaluating the new output function g0 in the two-step mode is at
most double that of evaluating g, then on average, the computational complexity of obtaining the next
output does not change: We clock the generator twice, but we get two outputs at once. If the output
space Y is equal to X then we can get very close to this without designing a new output function.
We will use the terminology of [13]. For a function g : X! X , define the Feistel permutation Dg : X£
X! X£ X by Dg(L ; R) defD (R; L'g(R)). (Here too, any Latin square operation ? can be used instead
of '.)
If the output function g is key dependent, then we can use a Luby–Rackoff construction. Denote the
key space by K , and assume that the size of the key space is exponential in log n.
THEOREM 7.2. Assume that the mapping • 7! g• is pseudorandom and that •1; •2; and •3 are
pseudorandom elements of K . Then for all functions f : X! X and seeds x0 2 X; the two-step generator
h ˆf ; Dg•1 – Dg•2 – Dg•3 i has pseudorandom output.
Proof. By Theorem 7.1, for all iteration functions f and seeds x0 2 X , the inputs to Dg•1 –Dg•2 –Dg•3
are all distinct. By a result of Luby and Rackoff [11], this implies pseudorandomness of the output. j
This construction makes the output calculation slower by a factor of 3 : 2. The computational com-
plexity of the following alternative is closer to the desired optimum and is a more straightforward
modification.
THEOREM 7.3. Assume that g : X! X is pseudorandom, and assume that h : X! X is pseudo-
randomly chosen from a family H of functions such that for all distinct x; y 2 X and for all z 2 X;
the probability that h(x)' h(y)D z (h 2 H ) is negligible. Then for all functions f : X! X and seeds
x0 2 X; the two-step counter-assisted generator h ˆf ; Dg – Dg – Dhi has pseudorandom output.
Proof. By a result of Lucks [12] (see also [13]), Dg – Dg – Dh is pseudorandom. The rest of the
proof is like in Theorem 7.2. j
There exist very efficient families H with the property mentioned in Theorem 7.1 (see [13] for
examples and references). Thus, the computational overhead of applying h is small, and the resulting
generator is almost as efficient as the original one. Note that, unlike the results in earlier sections, we
get here a black box modification of an iterative generator h f; gi which has maximal output diversity,
and if either one of the functions f or g is pseudorandom, then the output sequence is pseudorandom.
EXAMPLE 7.1. Let f D DES [14], gD RC5 [15], and h• : f0; 1g64!f0; 1g64 be a function from
Vazirani’s shift family (the i th bit of h• (x) is
Pn
iD1 xi• jCi¡1 mod 2; see [13] and [19]). The two-step
counter-assisted generator hdDES; DRC5 – DRC5 – Dh•i has maximal (state and output) diversity k for all
kD 1; 2; : : : ; 264. On average, the calculation of any output 64 bit block requires a single invocation
of DES and a single invocation of RC5. The execution time overhead of the rest of the operations is
negligible. Furthermore, if either one of the two functions DES and RC5 is difficult to distinguish from
random, then the output sequence will be difficult to distinguish from random as well.
OPEN PROBLEM 7.4. Assume that both f and g are (truly) random; and consider an output sequence
of length m generated from a random seed by the two-step counter-assisted generatorG2Dh ˆf ; Dg–Dgi.
What is the highest distinguishing probability between such a sequence and a random sequence?
Remark. Using the results from [13], we get that for all t , the output function of the t-step counter-
assisted mode can be modified in a black-box manner with a small computational overhead to get the
same diversity and pseudorandomness results. See [13] for details.
Remark. In certain cases, when t is large (e.g., t ‚ 4) it is desirable that the inputs to the t-step
output function are distinct in as many entries as possible (for example, this guarantees many active
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S-boxes in differential cryptanalysis of the output function). We can achieve this goal via letting the
next state be the same as when clocking the (standard) counter-assisted generator t times (that is, the
counter is incremented and added to the xi value every clock). By the isolated equality property, this
guarantees that any two t-tuples are distinct in at least bt=2c entries. In this mode of operation, the
diversity remains maximal as long as k< n=t .
7.2. Safe Transition to New Generations of Cryptographic Functions
A common practice in the design of new generations of cryptographic functions is to double the input
and output length. Nowadays, we experience the evolution from 64 bit functions (such as DES, RC5,
etc.) to 128 bit functions (such as the AES candidates [1]). The advantage of old generation functions is
that they have gone through years of extensive academic research and are thus well understood. It will
take a long time to gain similar confidence in the new generation functions.
Our two-step counter-assisted mode suggests a natural and straightforward way to combine new and
old generation functions in a way that if either one of them is pseudorandom, then the resulting generator
is pseudorandom: Assume that f is an old generation function and g is a new generation function with
double input size. Then we simply use the two-step counter-assisted generator h ˆf ; gi.
EXAMPLE 7.2. In Example 7.1, we can use RC6 instead of DRC5 – DRC5 – Dh• as the output func-
tion. This results in a faster and more elegant generator. Here too, the diversity is maximal for all
kD 1; : : : ; 264, and the generator is difficult to distinguish from random if either DES or RC6 is.
7.3. Cascaded Multiple-Step Counter-Assisted Generators
If we have enough state-space (this is usually the case with software encryption), we can cascade
multiple-step counter-assisted generators without decreasing the diversity. Consider for example gen-
erators G0;G1; : : : ;Gm¡1 having the same state-space and output-space. For any sequence of positive
integers t0< t1< ¢ ¢ ¢< tm¡1, and Latin-square operations ?t0 ; : : : ; ?tm¡2 (on spaces of size t0; t1; : : : ; tm¡2
blocks, respectively), the (t0; t1; : : : ; tm¡1)-step cascade is defined to be
G cascadeDG tm¡1m¡1?ˆtm¡2 ¢ ¢ ¢ ?ˆt1G t11 ?ˆt0 G t00
in the sense of Definition 6.1. Here, (x0; : : : ; xt jC1¡1) ?ˆt j (y0; : : : ; yt j¡1) is defined as the concatenation
of (x0; : : : ; xt jC1¡t j¡1) and (xt jC1¡t j ; : : : ; xt jC1¡1) ?t j (y0; : : : ; yt j¡1).
Using this notation, we have the following:
THEOREM 7.5. For all generators G0;G1; : : : ;Gm¡1 having the same state-space and output-space;
and for any Latin-square operations ?t0 ; : : : ; ?tm¡2 (on spaces of size t0< t1< ¢ ¢ ¢< tm¡2 blocks; respecti-
vely); the (t0; t1; : : : ; tm¡1)-step cascadeGcascadeDG tm¡1m¡1?ˆtm¡2 : : : ?ˆt1G t11 ?ˆt0G t00 has the following properties:
1. DGcascade (k)D k for all kD 1; 2; : : : n.
2. If either the iteration or the output function of any of the cascaded generators is pseudorandom;
then the output of Gcascade is pseudorandom as well.
Proof. (1) follows from Theorem 7.1, by induction on m. (2) follows readily from Theorem 6.1.
j
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
We have presented a new mode of operation which makes the diversity of every state sequence
provably large with a negligible computational cost. Unlike other solutions, this mode does not introduce
new (trivial) risks. The well-known threat of “no available theory” on the cycle structure of complicated
iterative generators (see, e.g., [4, p. 525], [3, p. 22], [16, Sect. 17.6], and [6, p. 347]) is eliminated. It is
important to stress, however, that the diversity measures only one aspect of security and is clearly not
sufficient for evaluating the cryptographical strength of the generator.
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Our new mode has various possible implementations via multiple-stepping and/or cascading which
allow the user a wide range of choices to fit the implementation to his or her constraints and needs. All
of the suggested modes require a counter, but in most of the applications a counter either already exists
or is easy to maintain. The cascaded mode reduces the provable diversity with respect to the simple
counter-assisted mode, but it suggests an interesting new way to combine the cryptographic strength
of several generators. The multiple-stepping mode requires a larger state buffer (and thus may be more
suitable in software applications), but ensures perfect diversity.
The cryptographical impact of our modification technique when the functions f or g are not pseudo-
random remains open. It is easy to find pathological examples of output functions where the modification
makes things worse, but we believe that such pathological cases will be easy to inspect. However, if the
user wants complete confidence, then he or she may wish to replace the output function g by one that
he or she trusts. In this case, it may be worthwhile to use the generator in the two-step mode and gain
the maximal possible diversity as in Section 7.
As we have proved, in the multiple-stepping modes it is enough that either the iteration or the output
function is pseudorandom to obtain pseudorandom output. This suggests combining two functions from
“orthogonal” sources, such as in Example 7.1, and combining strength of well-studied primitives with
with new, promising ones, as in Example 7.2.
The counter-assisted mode suggests many open problems. Some of these problems are mentioned in
the paper. To these we can add practical problems such as the challenge of finding a seed s for which the
counter-assisted generator with DES as the iteration function has DDES(s)(k) …
p
k for some large k and
theoretical problems such as statistical analysis of the behavior of the state sequence of counter-assisted
generators.
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